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prima facie meritorious defense, which cannot be controverted by
counter-affidavits. 14 It might be argued that the judge having found
no meritorious defense is presumed to have had before him facts
sufficient to negative it. 15 The answer, however, speaks for itself
as a part of the record of which the court will take judicial notice' 0
and from which the court will review the conclusions of the judge.17
The cases cited in the dissent on this point are all cases in which
no answer had been filed or no facts at all were found relative to
the negligence.' 8 While good practice may require the judge to set
out findings relative to a meritorious defense, any other holding, it
is submitted, would have been over technical and not in harmony
with the highly remedial purpose of §600.19
SUSIE SHARP.
Libel-Negotiable Instruments-Injury to Business
Reputation by Altering Check
Plaintiff, a corporation operating 2 general merchandise store,
gave defendant, a wholesale meat packing corporation, a post-dated
check for $54.99 to settle an account, as agreed. Defendant sent the
check in for collection with the date altered, making it payable at
once. The check was returned by the bank due to insufficient funds.
The plaintiff, having deposited enough to pay the check, sued the
defendant for damage to its credit and business reputation caused by
defendant's negligent, wanton, and willful premature presentation of
the check causing the bank to give false information that the plaintiff
had drawn a check without funds. A jury verdict of $2,000 was
affirmed, the plaintiff being entitled to such substantial damages as
would compensate for the injury as well as such punitive damages
as were proper punishment for such willful wrong.'
This case is without precedent or direct authority and was decided
by analogy to suits against banks for the wrongful dishonor of cus-
tomers' checks. The situations, while generally similar, are different
Salogar et al, 71 Cal. App. 290, 235 Pac. 86 (1925). 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS(1925) §286.
" 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, §289; 34 C. J. Judgements, §571 (3).
"Holcomb v. Holcomb, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926).
"123 C. J., Evidence, §1918; N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §1412; Wil-
son v. Beaufort County Lumber Co., 131 N. C. 164, 42 S. E. 565 (1902).
'T Norton v. McLaurin, 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1898).
" Sutherland v. McLean, supra note 7, at page 352.
S(1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 269.
'St. Charles Mercantile Co. v. Armour & Co., 153 S. E. 473 (S. C. 1930).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
in the respect that the latter cases are usually brought for injury to
plaintiff's credit with the company taking the check in payment while
here the injury is a loss of credit principally with the bank. The
wrongful act of the defendant resulted in a tort2 similar to slander
of title or disparagement of goods, in that it injured business repu-
tation by injuring credit. The bank was an innocent agent, and the
defendant's act was the proximate cause of the false information.
The plaintiff was blameless in issuing a post-dated check.3 Al-
though it is held by some jurisdictions that a post-dated check is the
same as if it hadn't been issued until the date thereof,4 the weight
of authority is that a post-dated check is not only a valid but a nego-
tiable instrument before its date.5 A post-dated check raises a pre-
sumption that the maker has an inadequate fund in the bank at the
time of giving the check but that he will have a sufficient deposit at
the date of presentation.8
A merchant or trader having a check wrongfully dishonored by a
bank is entitled to substantial damages7 without proof of actual loss
or damage, the injury to the credit and commercial standing of the
former being presumed.8 Where the non-payment is actuated by
fraud, gross negligence, or oppression, punitive damages also may be
'Winthrop v. Alien, 116 S. C. 388, 108 S. E. 153 (1921) ; Jackson v. Cham-
bers, 24 Ga. App. 285, 100 S. E. 659 (1919); Rich v. New York Cent. & H.
R. R. R., 87 N. Y. 382 (1882) ; Oliver v. Perkins et al., 92 Mich. 304, 52 N. W.
609 (1892).
'State v. Winter, 98 S. C. 294, 82 S. E. 419 (1914); State v. Crawford,
198 N. C. 522, 152 S. E. 504 (1930) ; Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 88
S. E. 687 (1916). Contra: People v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 Pac. 479,
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667 (1912); State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838,
23 A. L. R. 453 (1922) ; People v. Westerdahl, 316 Ill. 86, 146 N. E. 737 (1925).
"Merchants' & Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co., 56 S. C. 320, 33
S. E. 750 (1890) ; ln re Brown, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 1985, 2 Story 502, 6 Law Rep.
508 (1843) ; Symonds v. Riley, 188 Mass. 470, 74 N. E. 926 (1905).
'American Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 45 Cal. App. 118, 187 Pac. 128 (1920);
Wilson v. McEachern, 9 Ga. App. 584, 71 S. E. 946 (1911) ; Albert v. Hoff-
man, 64 Misc. 87, 117 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (1909); Breckenridge, Negotiability
of Post-dated Checks (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1063; Premature Payment of Post-
dated Checks (1930) 64 U. S. L. IZEv. 297.
'Lovell v. Eaton, 99 Vt. 255, 133 Ati. 742 (1925) ; State v. Crawford, supra
note 3; Clarke Nat. Bank v. Albion Bank, 52 Barb. 592 (N. Y. 1868).
"Wilson v. Palmetto Nat. Bank, 113 S. C. 508, 101 S. E. 841 (1920). "The
authorities agree that the plaintiff is entitled to something more than nominal
damages; but that the recovery should be temperate in amount." J. M. James
Co. v. Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 58 S. W. 261, 51 L. R. A. 255, 80 Am. St. Rep. 857
(1900) "Substantial, though temperate, damages, measured by all the facts
in the case"; Svendson v. Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N. W. 1086, 58 Am. St. Rep.
522, 31 L. R. A. 552 (1896). "General compensatory damages."
'Lorick v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S. C. 185, 54 S. E. 206 (1906);
Third Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Ober, 178 Fed. 678, 102 C. C. A. 178 (C. C. A.
8th, 1910) ; Levin v. Savings Bank, 133 La. 492, 63 So. 601 (1913).
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awarded. 9 The facts of this case tend to show that some agent of
the defendant acted with a fraudulent motive or else with such gross
negligence as to display a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights.
In view of the aggravated nature of the offense of altering the check
and the fact that the altered instrument operated to charge plaintiff
with the crime of issuing a check without funds, it is submitted that
the jury verdict may be upheld, although the actual loss to the plain-
tiff through loss of credit and damage to business reputation prob-
ably was slight under the circumstances.' 0
TRAVIS BROWN.
Marriage and Divorce-Annulment-Marriage in Jest
Infant plaintiff brought an equitable petition by her next friend
for the purpose of annuling her marriage to the defendant. She
alleged that she was fifteen years old and that the defendant was
nineteen, and that both resided with and were dependent upon their
respective parents. While attending a dinner dance, in a spirit of
fun, braggadocio, and levity, the parties began to dare each other to
get married. They drove across the state line into Alabama, procured
a license from a probate judge by means of falsifications by the de-
fendant as to their ages, and were married. Plaintiff alleged that
she returned home and had never lived with the defendant. De-
fendant entered a general demurrer for want of equity and on the
ground that the court of equity "was without jurisdiction or power
to annul a marriage under any circumstances." Held, demurrer
sustained.'
Two questions are presented in the case. The first, whether or
not a court of equity has jurisdiction to annul a marriage, had never
been adjudicated in Georgia and was left open by the court. There
are many cases which have decided that equity has such jurisdiction.
12 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (5th ed., 1917) §458. See Winkler v.
Citizens' State Bank, 89 Kan. 279, 131 Pac. 597, 598 (1913); American Nat.
Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 658, 69 S. W. 759, 760, 101 Am.
ST. REP. 379, 58 L. R. A. 956 (1902) ; McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine
of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rzv. 129.
" The plaintiff was insolvent at the time of the alleged occurrences leading
to the suit. It was not proved that the defendant's action contributed any sub-
stantial part to the plaintiff's going into bankruptcy thereafter.
'Hand v. Berry, 154 S. E. 239 (Ga. 1930).
